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Robust Protection of 
Journalistic Sources Remains a
Basic Condition for Press Freedom
In the judgment in the case Becker v. Norway the
ECtHR showed once more its concern about the im-
portance of the protection of journalistic sources for
press freedom and investigative journalism in partic-
ular. The EC2HR cannot automatically be removed
by virtue of a source’s own conduct, and that source
protection applies also when a source’s identity is
known. The judgment has been welcomed by the Eu-
ropean Federation of Journalists (EFJ), as it is per-
ceived “to strengthen the protection of journalistic
sources as one of the basic conditions for media free-
dom”. The EFJ also calls on states “to adopt legisla-
tion with the purpose of implementing journalists’
right to protect their sources, following international
standards” and strongly calls for a broad and effec-
tive protection of whistleblowers.
The law and the proceedings in Norway
The case concerns a journalist, Cecilie Langum
Becker, working for DN.no, a Norwegian internet-
based newspaper. Ms Becker was ordered to give ev-
idence in a criminal case brought against one of her
sources, Mr X, who was accused for market manipu-
lation. Mr X had confirmed to the police that he had
been Ms Becker’s source for an article she had writ-
ten about the Norwegian Oil Company’s (DNO) al-
legedly difficult financial situation. The price of DNO
stock decreased by 4.1 % on the first trading day after
the publication of Ms Becker’s article. Mr X was sub-
sequently charged with using Ms Becker to manipu-
late the financial market. Ms Becker refused to testify
against Mr X, and the courts therefore ordered her
to testify about her contacts with him, finding that
there was no source to protect as he had already
come forward. They also considered that her evi-
dence might significantly assist the courts in elucidat-
ing the case. Mr X was however convicted as charged
before the final decision on Ms Becker’s duty to give
evidence had been made. Relying on Article 125 of
the Norwegian Code of Criminal Procedure and Ar-
ticle 10 ECHR, Ms Becker argued that she was under
no obligation to give evidence and she refused at any
stage of the proceedings to answer questions about
possible contracts between her and Mr X and other
sources.
Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that: 
“The editor of a printed publication may refuse to
answer questions concerning who is the author of an
article or report in the publication or the source of
any information contained in it. The same applies to
questions concerning who is the source of other in-
formation that has been confided to the editor for use
in his work. Other persons who have acquired knowl-
edge of the author or the source through their work
for the publishers, editors, press agency or printers
in question have the same right as the editor.
When important social interests indicate that the in-
formation should be given and it is of substantial sig-
nificance for the clarification of the case, the court
may, however, on an overall evaluation order the wit-
ness to reveal the name. If the author or source has
revealed matters that it was socially important to dis-
close, the witness may be ordered to reveal the name
only when this is found to be particularly necessary.
When an answer is given, the court may decide that
it shall only be given to the court and the parties at a
sitting in camera and under an order to observe a
duty of secrecy.
The provisions of this section can apply correspond-
ingly to any director or employee of any broadcasting
agency.”
On account of her refusal to comply, the High Court,
in January 2012, ordered Ms Becker to pay a fine of
30,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately
3,700 euro (EUR) for an offence against the good
order of court proceedings, failing which she would
be liable to ten days’ imprisonment.
In March 2012 Ms Becker lodged an application with
the ECtHR, alleging that she had been compelled to
give evidence that would have enabled one or more
journalistic sources to be identified, in violation of her
right under Article 10 ECHR to receive and impart
information. It took the ECtHR more than five years
to decide on the case, but finally, with a unanimous
vote, the fifth section of the ECtHR on 5 October
2017 found that Norway has violated Ms Becker’s
right to protect her sources.
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The Court’s judgment
First of all, it is worth observing that the judgment of
the ECtHR not only refers to relevant legal provisions
and jurisprudence under Norwegian law and to Rec-
ommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right journalists
not disclose their sources of information, adopted by
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
on 8 March 2000. It also refers to other relevant in-
ternational material such as the 8 September 2015 re-
port to the UN General Assembly of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression. The
ECtHR quotes from this report, in which it is stated (§
40):
“Revealing or coercing the revelation of the identity
of a source creates disincentives for disclosure, dries
up further sources to report a story accurately and
damages an important tool of accountability. In the
light of the importance attached to source confiden-
tiality, any restrictions must be genuinely exceptional
and subject to the highest standards, implemented by
judicial authorities only. Such situations should be
limited to investigations of the most serious crimes or
the protection of the life of other individuals.”
As there was no discussion in the case at issue that
there had been an “interference” with the journalist’s
rights under Article 10 § 1 ECHR, as it was clear that
the order to give evidence was “prescribed by law”
and as it was undisputed that the order had been is-
sued for the purpose of “the prevention of crime”,
the ECtHR once more needed to focus on the ques-
tion whether the inference was “necessary in a dem-
ocratic society”.
The ECtHR refers to its earlier case law in which it
has developed the principles governing the protec-
tion of journalistic sources, such as in Goodwin v.
United Kingdom (§ 65):
“Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic
conditions for press freedom, as is reflected in the
laws and the professional codes of conduct in a num-
ber of Contracting States and is affirmed in several
international instruments on journalistic freedoms....
Without such protection, sources may be deterred
from assisting the press informing the public on mat-
ters of public interest. As a result the vital public-
watchdog role of the press may be undermined and
the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable
information may be adversely affected. Having re-
gard to the importance of the protection of journal-
istic sources for press freedom in a democratic society
and the potentially chilling effect an order of source
disclosure has on the exercise of freedom, such a
measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the
Convention unless it is justified by an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest. “
Referring to its Grand Chamber judgment in
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, it reiter-
ates that:
“The Court has always subjected the safeguards for
respect of freedom of expression in cases under Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention to special scrutiny. Having
regard to the importance of the protection of jour-
nalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic so-
ciety, an interference cannot be compatible with
Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an
overriding requirement in the public interest.”
The court reminds that in Nagla v. Latvia it found
that the fact that a source’s identity had been known
to the investigating authorities prior to a search at the
premises of a journalist, did not remove the journal-
ist’s protection under Article 10 ECHR and it em-
phasises that a journalist’s protection under Article 10
cannot automatically be removed by virtue of a
source’s own conduct. The ECtHR furthermore
holds that protection afforded to journalists when it
comes to their right to keep their sources confidential
is “two-fold, relating not only to the journalist, but also
and in particular to the source who volunteers to as-
sist the press in informing the public about matters of
public interest”, while in Voskuill v. The Netherlands
the ECtHR found that the potential significance in
criminal proceedings of the information sought from
a journalist was insufficient under Article 10 as a rea-
son to justify compelling him to disclose his source or
sources. It also emphasised that a chilling effect will
arise wherever journalists are seen to assist in the
identification of anonymous sources.
The ECtHR went on to consider that the possible ef-
fects of the order were of such a nature that the gen-
eral principles developed with respect to orders of
source disclosure were applicable to the case, and that
Ms Becker’s refusal to disclose her source or sources
did not at any point in time hinder the investigation
of the case or the proceedings against Mr X. On the
contrary, there was no indication that the Ms Becker’s
refusal to give evidence attracted any concerns of the
Norwegian courts with respect to the case or the evi-
dence against Mr X. It also bore in mind that Ms
Becker’s journalistic methods had never been called
into question and she had not been accused of any il-
legal activity.
Having regard to the importance of the protection of
journalistic sources for press freedom, the ECtHR
finds that the reasons adduced in favour of com-
pelling Ms Becker to testify on her contract with Mr
X, though relevant, we’re insufficient. Therefore the
ECtHR is not convinced that the impugned order
was justified by an “overriding requirement in the
public interest” and, hence, necessary in a democratic
society. The ECtHR accordingly concludes that there
has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR.
Comment
Since 1996 (Goodwin v. United Kingdom), the
ECtHR has found several types of violations of jour-
n a l i s t s ’  s o u r c e s  p r o t e c t i o n  a s  g u a r   Arti-
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cle 10 ECHR (see the factsheet of the ECtHR) Lux-
embourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and France at multiple occasions have been
found in breach with the right of journalists to have
their sources protected, while also authorities in
Latvia (Nagla v. Latvia) and Turkey (Gormus and oth-
ers v. Turkey) have disrespected journalists’ rights by
searching and investigating their sources. Although
Norway has a positive reputation when it comes to
protection of journalistic sources, as reflected e.g. in
the 2015 Supreme Court judgment in the case of
Rolfsen and Association of Norwegian Newspapers v.
Norwegian Prosecution Authority, this time, after
long deliberation, the ECtHR found that the Norwe-
gian authorities have acted in breach with Article 10
ECHR by compelling a journalist to reveal informa-
tion about a source.
While the reasoning and outcome in Becker v. Nor-
way is consistent with and builds upon the substan-
tial case law of the ECtHR guaranteeing robust
protection of journalistic sources, even if cases where
the source has been identified, also a disclaimer needs
to be formulated with regard some part of the rea-
soning of the ECtHR in this case.
The ECtHR observes that “the present case does not
involve allegations of unlawful activity by the appli-
cant, or criminal investigations of or proceedings
against her, beyond those related to her refusal to give
evidence on her contact with Mr X”. And in this con-
text, it also notes that the Government has not ques-
tioned the journalistic methods employed by Ms
Becker (§ 71.
This kind of consideration however risks undermin-
ing the protection of journalistic sources. Indeed, as
a matter of principle, sources should not loose pro-
tection because of the allegedly unlawful, unethical or
questionable conduct of the journalist. Furthermore,
in as far as the Court’s consideration refers to the fact
that the Government has not questioned the journal-
istic methods used by the journalist in this case. It
might imply that in cases where the Government does
question or criticize the journalistic methods, there
would no longer be a valid claim on the right of jour-
nalistic source protection. Also in cases where a jour-
nalist is charged or prosecuted for alleged unlawful
acts, the right to protection of journalistic sources
should remain to be guaranteed (Tillack v. Belgium).
A recent judgment with regard to the protection of
journalistic protection (Gormus and others v. Turkey)
contains a worrying consideration of a similar kind.
The ECtHR acknowledged in Gormus and others v.
Turkey that the duties and responsibilities of journal-
ists can include the duty not to publish information
provided by whistle-blowers who have not first inter-
nally informed their superiors about potentially un-
lawful practices with their department or service. In
its original French version of the judgment, the Court
considered that it could accept
“que les devoirs et les responsabilités qu’assument les
journalistes qui exercent leur droit à la liberté d’ex-
pression puissent inclure le devoir de ne pas publier
les renseignements que des fonctionnaires lanceurs
d’alerte leur ont fournis, jusqu’à ce que ces fonction-
naires aient utilisé les procédures administratives in-
ternes prévues pour faire part de leurs
préoccupations à leurs supérieurs ”.
This consideration however, formulated as a general
principle that journalists should only publish infor-
mation obtained from whistle-blowers that have first
exhausted all internal procedures that are available
to them, is very problematic. This approach also con-
trasts with earlier case law of the ECtHR in which the
Court was of the opinion that a “journalist’s right not
to reveal her or his sources could not be considered a
mere privilege to be granted or taken away depend-
ing on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources,
but is part and parcel of the right to information, to
be treated with the utmost caution” (Tillack v. Bel-
gium, §128).
More attention is also to be given to what has been
stated in the earlier mentioned 2015 report to the UN
General Assembly of the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, referring to the Belgian law
of 7 April 2005 on protection of journalistic sources.
“National laws should ensure that protections apply
strictly, with extremely limited exceptions. Under Bel-
gian law, journalists and editorial staff may be com-
pelled by a judge to disclose information sources only
if they are of a nature to prevent crimes that pose a se-
rious threat to the physical integrity of one or more
persons, and upon a finding of the following two cu-
mulative conditions: (a) the information is of crucial
importance for preventing such crimes: and (b) the
information cannot be obtained by any other means.
The same conditions apply to investigate measures,
such as searches, seizures and telephone tapping,
with respect to journalistic sources” (§40).
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